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Children Facing Death:
Recurring Patterns of Adaptation (Revised)
Deborah E. Greenham
Roger A. Lohmann

This article examines a number of recent studies on adjustment problems faced by
dying children. Particular attention is given to the relationship between growth and
development and the child’s awareness of their impending death. Two principal
topics connecting research with clinical practice will be examined in this article: the
research on awareness contexts translates into the clinical issue of whether or not to
tell children of their impending death. Likewise, the question of how immature
children who are dying cope with their impending death and their understanding of
the effect it will have on others.
Emotional growth and situational adjustment are primary concerns is much
recent research on death and dying. Social workers who work with the dying are
generally familiar with Elizabeth Kübler-Ross’s account of the gradual and
progressive emotional acceptance of death. She suggests a sequence of five stages –
denial, disbelief, victimage (“why me? woe is me.” feelings), rage and a final stage of
acceptance. She argues that this sequence explains not only the inevitability of one’s
own death, but also acceptance of the death of others (Levy, 1976, 79-93). Glaser
and Strauss describe the typical patterns of relations between the dying and their
significant others in terms of “awareness contexts” which they say can be open,
closed or suspected and may involve mutual pretense, based on the degree of
communication involved and acknowledgement of the reality of death (Glaser &
Strauss, 1965). In this study, an awareness context is defined as “the total
combination of what each interactant in a situation knows about the identity of the
others and his own identity in the eyes of the other.”
Much of the best-known research literature on death and dying, including the
two studies mentioned above, is based on and most applicable to, emotionally
mature adults. But, what about deaths of children who don’t have the emotional
maturity or the full range of social skills that the Kübler-Ross stages or the GlaserStrauss awareness contexts point to? Few human experiences are more shattering
than the death of a child. Many social workers, like most other adults, fear the
emotionally shattering impact of allowing themselves to see, hear and respond to
the behavior of a dying child, which seems to awaken one of the deepest fears of
humankind – the fear of death before the fulfillment of a life fully lived.
Until recently, the conventional, widespread assumption among many assumed
that children understood death as a reversible event and that they did not recognize
the concept of mortality (Levy, 1976, 81). Probably this view was derived from

observations from child’s play, where those who “die” are seen to collapse, remain
still and then arise again and rejoin the play. In the Glaser-Strauss terminology, it
was assumed that children have a type of closed awareness – that they have not yet
reached the stage of maturation in which they are able to deal with the powerful
emotions related to death – and that efforts to disrupt this “nature order” could
prove emotionally damaging to the child. Recent research on dying has begun to
spell out more clearly the complex relations between personal development,
situational factors and the acceptance of death among children. Much of this
research has been done with young terminally ill cancer victims, although
presumably many of the conclusions also apply to children dying of other causes.
Acceptance of the implications of this recent research for social work practice
with dying children offers support for certain well-accepted procedures, but there is
still a need to readjust certain time-worn notions. Two principal topics will be
examined in what follows: the research on awareness contexts translates into the
clinical issue of whether or not to tell children of their impending death. Likewise,
the question of how those who have not yet achieved maturity cope with their
impending death and their understanding of the effect it will have on others.

To Tell Or Not Tell?
Until the early 1970s shielding young patients from the knowledge of a lifethreatening disease was probably the norm among all helping professionals
(Kaplan, 1973). For the most part, this was just a question of when children really
can understand death. Solnit and Provence reflected a widely held view in
suggesting that a child’s concept of death does not crystalize until adolescence (Ross
& Klar, 1982, 148). If this were so, then it would not be helpful to tell preadolescent
children they are dying, mostly because the information would have little
significance for them. However, as continuing concern over this issue implies, young
children do, indeed, develop their own (however limited) understanding of their own
and others’ deaths. Several research studies make this clear. As reported by Levy,
Robert Fulton used word association , response times and galvanic skin tests to
determine a pattern of increasing emotional involvement with “death words” by
children between the ages of 5 and 15 (Fulton, 1977; Levy, 1976). Anthony found
several distinguishable levels of linguistic understanding between the ages of 3 and
13 among English-speaking children. These ranged from ignorance to clear, logical
or biological definition (e.g., the understanding that death involves the cessation of
brain function). These findings closely parallel those of Piaget with regard to the
developmental concept of causality: By age 5 or 6 children attach a definite meaning
to the word death, and by age 8 or 9, almost all children use a causal-logical
explanation to some degree. Thus, it is both theoretically plausible and empirically
likely that most children achieve some “realistic” understanding of death, both
emotionally and cognitively at an early age and that their concept of death is
already well developed long before adolescence. The idea that children cannot or do

not understand death is only a valid rational for not telling children about their
impending death in the case of extremely young children (e.g., those under age 5).
A more open approach to this question began to gain ground in the late 1960s
and early 1970s, after it was discovered that terminally ill children are often aware
of their prognosis even if they are not told, and that secrecy often sets up a circular
process (in both children and adults) tin which the necessary evasions and
deceptions of significant others and caregivers erodes trust, provokes excessive fear,
withdrawal, anxiety and frustration. For those children old enough to have even a
primitive conception of death, the burden of evidence and contemporary opinion
seems to support “open illness,” that is, telling the child and confronting the matter
openly (Levy, 1976, 72).
Those who are still skeptical will ask: but how will children deal with this
information? One approach to this question is the intellectual-cognitive approach
suggested by the previous reference to Piaget. Not only should children be informed
that they have a fatal illness but they should also be encouraged to turn to
caregivers for answers to the inevitable questions. For example, after knowing and
understanding their conditions, Vernick and Karon (1965) found that children’s
tension levels were significantly lowered. They also found in a subsequently study
that most children were actually relieved to openly acknowledge and discuss their
serious concerns about death (Karon & Vernick, 1968). In the absence of
encouragement, children may actually come to believe that if they openly express
fear of death, further contact with others may be lost (Waechter, 1971). Death may
be considered an inappropriate topic of conversation with adults, but BluebondLangor (1978) argues that children may interpret it as their responsibility to give
emotional support for others (including adults) in such circumstances. Children are
capable of selecting their behavior to affect the ways others see them.
A second approach combines the cognitive with the emotional: William M.
Easson , for example, argues that children’s reactions to their dying and death
depend on their level of understanding and emotional maturity (Easson, 1970).
Children begin to deal with approaching death as they become aware of the
necessity of doing so, and they are then able to respond with the unique strengths
that children have. Easson links children’s understanding of death with their
development of self-awareness and identifies five developmental stages that
children undergo in their understanding of death. In the first stage, infants have no
understanding; only the physiological reflexes that strive to maintain life. During
the second state (which Easson dates from 5 months to two years), children’s
reactions to their own deaths is influenced by the physical processes that produce
death. They react not only to the discomfort and pain they feel but also to the
anxiety of their parents. By the third stage (3-4 years old) children already begin to
understand that they have a separate physical existence and emotional identity. As
a result, they begin to recognize and deal with feelings of being and nonbeing. By
the fourth stage (4-5 years old), Easson says, children’s understanding of their
diagnosis becomes a function of intellectual growth and training. Full

understanding of the diagnosis and of its implications for them and their significant
others is possible by this point. By the time they reach the fifth stage (usually be
ages 5-7 years old) children are able to grasp abstract concepts, understand the
meaning of present and future time and become progressively less able thereafter to
avoid the full meaning of their death.
Such development is not serial and unilinear, however. Both the normal
interruptions and setbacks experienced by other children and by other dying
patients, and the special, poignant regressions of the dying affect these children.
Leyn noted that as death approaches, preschool aged children may, at times,
regress to emotional levels at which they no longer feel that they are independent
but rather that they and their parents exist as a unit, and thus the children will
survive (and even live forever) (Leyn, 1976). Such a reaction, it should be noted,
may well be the particular reaction of small children to the more general reaction of
denial. With older children, the growing realization of their anticipated death, as
noted by Easson, and the concomitant link to deals of being and non-being,
combined with the emergence of a sense of self also brings with it the growing
realization that dying means separation from loved ones.

Expanding (And Shrinking) Social Worlds
Bluebond-Langor links cognitive and emotional events with the emerging social
matric of children. She conceptualizes children’s acquisition of information about
their world and their place in it as a socialization process occurring simultaneously
with the dying process (Bluebond-Langor, 1978). She finds that many dying
children have a greater understanding of their circumstances than they may reveal
to the adult world and that their decisions not to reveal their awareness reflects
their unique knowledge of the social order to which they are being socialized, and an
understanding of what it means to die “a proper death” in their society.
Like many other authorities on this subject, Bluebond-Langor attempts to
capture the dynamic, unfolding events of a child’s death by using a “stage model”
which beaks an action or event into clear, discrete stages in sequence. However, her
approach is unique in that she links the progressive stages as experience,
information and self-evaluation of children. It is the question of concrete
information, she argues, that brings about adjustments in the self-concept of dying
children. Without the requisite knowledge of their situation, children cannot
integrate new information or come to new conclusions about themselves and their
worlds.
Bluebond-Langor argues that children with leukemia pass through five stages in
the acquisition of information, while simultaneously passing through five different
conceptions of themselves. In the first stage, children learn that leukemia is a
serious disease. Much the same could be expected with other, similarly serious,
potentially fatal illnesses. At this time, they may begin to accumulate additional
disease-related information; e.g., about drugs and their side effects. They
voluntarily inform people of their new identity as “sick”. At any point, they may

begin to exhibit lesions and explain to others how seriously ill they are. Through
feedback, they gin confirmation in this transition of their new identity from others’
reactions to them. They will probably hold this image of themselves as sick until
they receive evidence that they may be getting better. Particularly important in this
regard is confirmation of their improvement from their peers; other children with
leukemia and their parents.
Passage to the second stage requires the experience of remission of symptoms
and the discovery of the relationship of medication and recovery. Bluebond-Langor
observed that children with leukemia carried on long, detailed conversations at
various times with other hospitalized children with similar experiences. However,
shared information is only synthesized into a reorganization of thoughts and
feelings by a relapse. Whenever a relapse occurs, adults tend to speak less openly
with child patients, answering as few questions as possible. In any case, staff
members in hospitals and clinics tend to give only brief explanations, usually at
concrete, descriptive levels, for what they are doing. They seldom talk about the
implications and they avoid extended interaction with child patients. This explains
in part why and how children with comparable experiences turn to one another for
information. In this stage, children who are dying begin to observe and understand
the taboos of disease and death.
The third stage is marked by an understanding of the purposes and implications
of special procedures that may be used to administer medications and additional
types of treatment that may be required to deal with side effects. With recurrent
relapses and complications of medications, the child patient’s sense of well-being
begins to fade. As their world becomes increasingly hospital-centered, they become
increasingly aware that they are different from other children.
In the fourth stage, child patients come to view their illness as a permanent
condition. They view themselves as always sick, never getting better. They may put
treatment, procedures and symptoms into larger perspective and see the full cycle of
relapses and remissions, realizing that medications do not last as long as they are
supposed to and that their peers share with them not only the same experiences but
the same fatal prognosis. It is only on receiving information of the death of a peer,
however, that these children come to realize that the cycle of recurrent relapses and
remissions cannot continue indefinitely and eventually ends in death.
This fifth and final stage brings with it the realization that there is only a finite
number of medications, and that when these medications are no longer effective,
death is inevitable. Children in this stage often express awareness of their
prognosis – directly and indirectly – in their conversations and by the kind of
reading, art and play they are interested in. It also impacts their view of time and
their behavior toward others (Natterson & Knutson, 1960). Their concerns and
anxieties about their welfare are poignantly revealed in their questions about other
children who have died. Vernick and Karon note that although children apparently
accepted evasive answers to their questions, the attempt to deceive as never
successful with children between the ages of nine and twenty (Vernick & Karon,

1965). Such deception likely prevents the development of empathic bonds between
these children and adults. The children then tend to remain silent, outwardly
accepting adults’ lies but inwardly feeling threatened.
Easson notes that when a peer death occurs each child on the ward may become
part of a group denial process (Easson, 1970). These child patients learn not to be
outwardly disturbed when another patient disappears from their midst and doesn’t
return. Each parent works with the others to support this denial and to maintain
this necessary façade.
The child-patient’s personal experiences, Bluebond-Langor argues, are the
critical factor in the passage through these various stages ((Bluebond-Langor,
1978). Disease related experiences, including nosebleeds, bone pain, and injections
become the basis for gathering new disease-related information, which then
becomes the raw material for the reworking of the child-patient’s self-concept.
Clinics, hospitals and other places where opportunities for interaction with peers
are possible are the locales for gathering such information on what is happening.
The experience of having a life-threatening disease allows children to assimilate
information by relating what they see and hear to what they feel and think. Ill
children seldom ask about things that are not happening to them. Thus, the
experience of being socialized to their illness and its implications is of central
importance for them. Experience also explains why (except at the extreme youngest
ages) age and intellectual ability are not related to the speed or completeness with
which children pass through various stages of awareness. Some three and four year
olds of average intelligence with extensive disease-related experience know more
about their prognosis than very intelligent nine year olds who are still in their first
remission or have had fewer clinical experiences and are aware only that they have
a serious illness.
Bluebond-Langor also notes that the time lapses between stages tend to be
experienced based and the same for most children regardless of age. Passage from
the first stage to the second occurs rapidly for everyone upon relapse. Passage
through the second, third and fourth stages takes somewhat longer, and there is an
indefiniteness about these three stages in general. However, passage to the fifth
stage often takes place immediately upon the child learning of the death of another
child, and all knowledge from previous stages is quickly synthesized into this new
self-awareness.

Conclusion
One of the most devastating themes in the entire literature on death and dying
is the “open awareness” dilemma that dying children face. Even though the
evidence clearly suggests that dying children are typically aware of their terminal
condition, acknowledgement of that awareness can bring with it the threats of social
ostracism and emotional abandonment by parents, caregivers and significant others
who may find the added emotional burdens of the child’s awareness unbearable.

Bluebond-Langor observed children who saw their own task in live as providing
emotional support for others. By acceding to the adult’s wishes to maintain an
atmosphere of mutual pretense, these children hope to keep the parent-child and
caregiver-patient relations from breaking down. They respond to the pattern of
social order and to the apparent personal needs of others with whom they are in
contact, and thereby gain or maintain feelings of social worth. Such social worth, in
turn, allows them to feel more like normal children and to act as if they have a
future. By reinforcing the hopes of the adults around them, they guarantee the
continuous presence of those adults. In this way, they allow their caregivers to
practice reciprocal roles. In ordinary circumstances, parents are responsible for
nurturing, protecting and rearing their children, but these ordinary tasks become
impossible in the face of terminal illness. As a result, parents often feel pressured
into pretense. And physicians are similarly able to salvage their self-esteem in the
face of losing a patient, and able to continue to work with dying children by
engaging in mutual pretense.
When children sense that parents and physicians are lying to them, they are
likely to lose confidence in trust in these adults (Zeligs, 1974). Karon and Vernick
note that if physicians act to prevent children from gaining realistic knowledge of
the disease in its terminal phases, the usual result is the progressive emotional
withdrawal of the staff from the children, almost as if the children had already died.
Zeligs believes that it is the journey toward death, and not the moment of death,
that is most frightening to children, and that children forced to cope with a
conspiracy of silence are forced to die a thousand deaths. By contrast, if the staff
and parents have instilled feelings of confidence in the child, they will be able to
draw emotional support from these same relationships in their final days.
Consequently, much of the published literature speaks of the marked tendencies
toward partially closed awareness and mutual pretense among dying children.
Presumably, the extent to which this tendency prevails is related to the child’s level
of social development, with older, more mature, children far more likely to engage
in this practice than younger ones.
Research studies with dying children strongly suggest patterns of relationships
between the growth and development of the dying child, the level of awareness of
the child to their dying, and the children’s emotional and social handling of the
reality of their own death. Because a growing number of social workers deal
regularly with this problem, further investigation of the implications for social work
practice of these research findings is needed.
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